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THE INTERPRETATIVE EFFECT OF EUROPEAN LAW IN 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CROATIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT No U-III-1410/2007
Boris StaniÊ*
Summary: On 13 February 2006, the Constitutional Court of Croatia 
issued a very important judgment in which it resolved a diffi cult situ-
ation created by divergent judgments of the Administrative Court of 
Croatia in which The Administrative Court ruled on decisions made 
by the Croatian Competition Agency. The Administrative Court’s judg-
ments diverged in the interpretation of the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the European 
Community. In the ongoing pre-accession period it is of great impor-
tance to instruct the Croatian judiciary how and when the criteria 
and standards of the comparative law of the European Community 
should be applied. This is especially important in cases which involve 
the Croatian Constitutional Court, as its primary function is to pre-
serve the division of powers in Croatia. According to the Administra-
tive Disputes Act,1 an administrative dispute can be initiated against 
the decisions of administrative bodies2 against which appeals are not 
permitted, in other words before the Administrative Court. Given that 
the largest part of the European acquis communautaire relates to ad-
ministrative law, the focus points of the application of European law in 
Croatia will be administrative legislation, administrative proceedings 
and administrative law in general. 
* Boris StaniÊ, attorney at law, PhD candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb.The au-
thor wishes to thank Miljenko Giunio LLM, editor of the journal Pravo u Gospodarstvu, who 
previously published parts of this paper, Professor Siniša Rodin, Head of the Jean Monet 
Department for Public European Law at the University of Zagreb, and also his associates 
in the Department, for their helpful suggestions. Gratitude is also due to the Department 
for organising the annual ‘Advanced Issues of European Law’ seminar in Dubrovnik, where 
researchers can exchange opinions with respected international experts on European law.
1 Offi cial Gazette (OG) 53/91, 9/92 and 77/92. This was a regulation from the SFR Yu-
goslavia which was applied, with certain changes, in Croatia from 8 October 1991. At the 
moment this regulation was adopted, the one published in the Offi cial Gazette of the SFR 
Yugoslavia 4/77 came into force. See Jakša BarbiÊ, Graansko, TrgovaËko, Radno i Upravno 
Pravo - Novine Nakon Preuzimanja Saveznih Propisa (Organizator, Zagreb 1992).
2  Ministries, ie the executive, are the most common bodies that decide in the second in-
stance or, on the basis of law, issue decisions against which there is no opportunity to ap-
peal. In this manner, the Administrative Court, as the judicial body, directly controls the 
decisions of the executive.
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1. The relevant facts of the case
The undertaking PZ Auto Ltd, headquartered in Velika Gorica, Zagre-
baËka bb (the licensed distributor for Volkswagen motor vehicles in Croatia) 
on 26 January 2001 cancelled further business co-operation3 regarding the 
distribution of Volkswagen personal motor vehicles with AMC Meimurje 
Ltd of »akovec and Autohrvatska Pula Ltd of Pula. These two latter under-
takings considered such conduct to be a violation of the Croatian Compe-
tition Act4 (hereinafter: the old CCA) and consequently initiated two sepa-
rate proceedings before the Croatian Competition Agency (hereinafter: the 
Agency). The two proceedings were merged into one and the Agency fi nally 
reached a decision in which it established that PZ Auto Ltd had abused its 
monopolistic position on the market as licensed distributors of Volkswa-
gen personal motor vehicles in Croatia. Consequently, the Agency ordered 
PZ Auto Ltd to continue business co-operation with all5 licensed distribu-
tors of Volkswagen vehicles in Croatia with which they had signed letters of 
intent for a period of one year. In addition, the Agency ordered PZ Auto Ltd 
to create, within a period of 30 days, a list of qualitative and objective cri-
teria for remaining within the group of licensed distributors of Volkswagen 
vehicles and to deliver the list to the Agency and to everyone with whom it 
had established business co-operation on the basis of the letter of intent. 
PZ Auto Ltd was also ordered to sign a contract for a period of at least 5 
years with all undertakings that had complied with the criteria. 
Given that the Croatian competition law in force at the time did not 
contain any by-laws to regulate the distribution of motor vehicles, the 
Agency had, besides the old CCA,6 through the principle of subsidiarity 
applied the methods, criteria and standards of the comparative law of 
3  Business co-operation was based on a letter of intent which the undertaking PZ Auto Ltd 
of Zagreb, as an importer of Volkswagen vehicles, signed on 10 December 1999 with several 
undertakings in Croatia (including AMC Meimurje Ltd of »akovec and Autohrvatska Pula 
Ltd of Pula) which thereby gained the status of licensed distributors. With this letter of 
intent, licensed Volkswagen distributors were obliged to ensure the façades of their facili-
ties were in accordance with the directives given by the principal and instructions issued 
by the importer, ie PZ Auto Ltd. However, AMC Meimirje Ltd and Autohrvatska Pula Ltd 
were never, in two years of co-operation, given any instructions, directives or standards that 
referred to the appearance of retail or service facilities.
4  The area of competition entered the Croatian legal order in 1995. Precisely because of the 
need to join the European common market, Croatia started building a free-market system. 
In the last thirteen years, big steps have been taken in this fi eld. The Croatian Competition 
Agency is the regulatory body that supervises, co-ordinates, approves, and also educates 
undertakings, and initiates proceedings concerning sanctions in certain cases. The activi-
ties of the Agency concerning the protection of competition can be divided into two time pe-
riods. The fi rst refers to the time period from the foundation of the Agency until the signing 
of the SAA, and the second period refers to the period afterwards. 
5  There were 27 distributors with whom PZ Auto Ltd was co-operating.  
6  At the time, the old Competition Act was in force (OG 48/95, 52/97, 89/98).
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the European Union on this subject. The authority to apply these rules 
existed, in the Agency’s opinion, on the basis of Article 70/2 of the Sta-
bilisation and Association Agreement between the European Community 
and its Member States and the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter: SAA) 
signed on 29 October 2001.7 The provisions of Articles 40 and 70 of the 
SAA correspond to the provisions of Articles 27 and 35 of the Interim 
Agreement on trade and trade-related provisions between the European 
Community and the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter: Interim Agreement). 
The Interim Agreement was also signed on 29 October 2001 and was 
temporarily applied from 1 January 2002 (entering into force on 1 March 
2002) until the entering into force of the SAA (1 February 2005). PZ Auto 
Ltd initiated an administrative dispute before the Administrative Court 
against the decisions of the Agency within the prescribed time limit. The 
Administrative Court refused the claim as non-grounded and affi rmed 
the Agency’s decision.8 Dissatisfi ed with the Administrative Court’s judg-
ment, PZ Auto Ltd fi led an appeal against the judgment with the Croatian 
Constitutional Court.
2. Applicable law
Article 140 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia9 states that 
international agreements that are concluded and ratifi ed in accordance with 
the Constitution and made public will be part of the Republic’s internal legal 
order10 and in terms of legal effect supersede the law. Their provisions may 
be changed or repealed only under conditions and in a way specifi ed by 
them or in accordance with the general rules of international law.
The SAA is by its nature such an agreement.11 By signing the SAA, 
Croatia has taken the fi rst important formal step in institutionalising its 
7  OG - International Agreements, 14/01.
8  See Boris StaniÊ, ‘Europsko Pravo i Upravn Sud RH’ [2007] 3 Pravo u Gospodarstvu.
9  Constitution of the Republic of Croatia - consolidated version (OG 41/01, 55/01).
10  The same was provided for in Art 5 of the Courts Act in force at the time (OG 3/94, 
100/96, 131/97, 129/00, 101/03, 17/04), which in subparagraph 2 stipulated that judges 
rule on the basis of international agreements that form part of the legal order of Croatia and 
that they apply other regulations that are enacted on the basis of the Constitution, inter-
national agreements or laws. The SAA is, as a ratifi ed international agreement, a source of 
law. In terms of its legal effect, it supersedes laws, and is thus binding.
11  The SAA can be defi ned as an international agreement between Croatia and the Mem-
ber States of the European Communities and the European Communities themselves. It 
was signed in 2001 and ratifi ed in Croatia the same year. The other signatories required a 
longer period of ratifi cation, which meant the SAA entered into force on 1 February 2005. 
In the opinion of Professor Siniša Rodin, this is an association agreement of a new gen-
eration of mixed agreements (mixed agreements are those that have to be ratifi ed by both 
Member States and the European Community). See Siniša Rodin, ‘Sporazum o Stabilizaciji 
i Pridruživanju u Pravnom Poretku Europske Zajednice i Republike Hrvatske’ [2003] 3-4 
Zbornik PFZ.
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relationship with the EU. This represents the start of the comprehensive 
work of implementing obligations that have been undertaken, as well as 
testing Croatia’s ability to fulfi l all the conditions necessary for full mem-
bership of the EU in all its three pillars.12  
The process of harmonising the Croatian legal order with the Eu-
ropean acquis communautaire has, in accordance with Article 69 of the 
SAA, become a permanent process. Each new Croatian regulation must 
be in accordance with European law, and existing regulations will be 
harmonised within a short period of time. In addition, it is expected that 
those who apply the regulations in all instances will interpret them in the 
spirit of European law. The new level of trade relations established with 
EU Member States by the SAA13 imposes the obligation of understanding 
European law and court practice.
As a consequence of signing the SAA and in order to implement it, 
Croatia adopted the new Competition Act14 (hereinafter: CCA) and vari-
ous by-laws to regulate certain questions in a more detailed manner than 
the Act itself. The SAA contains provisions that regulate competition and 
that are very similar to the primary law and CCA. For example, Article 
70 of the SAA states that the following are incompatible with the proper 
functioning of the SAA, in so far as they may affect trade between the 
Community and Croatia:
a) all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition;
b) abuse by one or more undertaking of a dominant position in the ter-
ritories of the Community or of Croatia as a whole or in a substantial 
part thereof;
c) any State aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or certain products.
These provisions have their source in Article 81 of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community and are also provided for in Article 9 of 
the CCA. It is important to emphasise that the SAA further on states that 
any practices contrary to these provisions will be assessed on the basis of 
criteria arising from the application of the competition rules appli-
12  On the metaphor of the three pillars of the EU see Eillen Denza, The Intergovernmental 
Pillars of the European Union (OUP, Oxford - New York 2002).
13  In the preamble of the agreement, the expectation is expressed that the SAA will create a 
new climate for economic relations between signatories, and above all for the development 
of trade and investment, factors crucial to economic restructuring and modernisation.
14  OG 122/03. See Siniša PetroviÊ, ‘Novo Hrvatsko Pravo Tržišnog Natjecanja’ [2004] 4 
Pravo u Gospodarstvu.
251CYELP 4 [2008] 247-265
cable in the Community.15 It also states that any practices contrary to 
these provisions will be assessed according to the criteria established 
by the Community on the basis of Articles 36 and 37 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and specifi c Community in-
struments adopted on this basis. These provisions are especially im-
portant for the following analysis of the judgments mentioned earlier.
3. Proceedings
Although it is in its nature a very complicated system and a very de-
manding subject, for the purpose of this paper it can, in general, be said 
that the CCA establishes proceedings in such a way that the Agency’s 
decisions are considered fi nal in administrative proceedings16 although 
an administrative dispute can be initiated against them. 
On becoming independent, Croatia, through the adoption of existing 
federal laws, maintained the existing federal regulation of administrative 
proceedings and disputes. Although certain minor changes have been 
made, the regime has remained the same. The situation has remained 
like this for seventeen years since the adoption of the laws. In the mean-
time, the number of administrative proceedings has multiplied enor-
mously and, in addition, the Administrative Court has been periodically 
encumbered with new cases mostly the result of political decisions which 
have been left to the administration to perform, such as cases regarding 
the acquisition of Croatian citizenship in the early 1990s, and cases con-
cerning the payment of debts to pensioners in the late 1990s. In addition, 
many regulations stipulate that administrative bodies such as ministries, 
the government or government agencies or directorates, decide in the 
fi rst instance and issue fi nal decisions. The result of this whole situation 
is the relatively low level of effi ciency of the Administrative Court. The 
average duration of proceedings before it is 3 years from the receipt of 
the initial application. The Administrative Court nowadays adjudicates 
in every possible fi eld (citizenship, building licences, healthcare, social 
protection, registration of associations, renovation of homes destroyed 
during the war, cadastres, taxes, military service, etc). The panel of three 
judges that has to adjudicate in certain cases17 is often, due to the long 
duration of proceedings, faced with the problem of passing judgment on 
15  Especially Art 81, 82, 86 and 87 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
but also interpretative instruments adopted by Community institutions.
16  In Croatia, administrative proceedings are governed by the general rules on proceedings 
provided for in the General Administrative Proceedings Act (OG 51/91). This was a law of 
the former federal state which originated from 1956 but which was incorporated into the 
Croatian legal system at the time of the independence of Croatia on  8 October 1991.
17  See Željko Dupelj, ‘Donošenje Odluka u Upravnom Sporu’ [2003] 3 Pravo u Gospo-
darstvu.
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the basis of a regulation that is no longer in force. The system as it is de-
mands too much from judges of the Court. In what have so far been un-
successful attempts at judicial reform, the administrative judiciary has 
not been seriously looked at. Hence, there is no reason to expect that it 
will come under the spotlight any time soon.
There is also another important restriction affecting quality that 
Croatia has not remedied yet. This refers to the fact that the Administra-
tive Court’s sessions are not public, which means that proceedings take 
place without the participation of the parties.18 Such arrangements for 
court proceedings are not in accordance with the principles of Europe-
an law in a broader sense.19 Such proceedings before the Administrative 
Court (provided for in Article 34 (1) of the Administrative Disputes Act) 
meant that Croatia had to make a reservation in respect of Article 6(1) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR), the 
only reservation that Croatia had to make. It is obvious that Croatia, at 
the time of its accession to the Council of Europe, was not able to reform 
its administrative judiciary. However, given the obligations arising from 
accession to the EU, this question will have to be solved.20
In the fi eld of competition, experts have constantly argued that a 
system in which a court lacking in specialisation and dealing with ques-
tions of competition in enormously long proceedings that are not in pub-
lic is far from an ideal solution.21
In the fi rst years in which the Administrative Court dealt with com-
petition cases, there was no great fl ow of competition cases, as shown in 
Table 1.22
18  The law provides for the possibility of verbal argument if the complexity of the disputed 
administrative area (whether fact or law) or the need for a better and integral solution to 
the case so requires. It is up to the court to issue such a decision. However, this is merely 
a legal possibility that is never applied.
19  European law in a broader sense refers to the laws of the EU and the laws of the Council 
of Europe.
20  Other Central European countries are not immune to similar problems conditioned by 
the structure of their judiciaries and understanding of European legal subject matter; see 
Michal Bobek, ‘A New Legal Order, or a Non-Existent One? Some (Early) Experiences in the 
Application of EU Law in Central Europe’ (2006) in 2 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & 
Policy 265 in which the author even raises the interesting question: Iura novit curia - Does 
it really?
21  See Siniša PetroviÊ, ‘Novo Hrvatsko Pravo Tržišnog Natjecanja’ [2004] 4 Pravo u Gospo-
darstvu where proceedings for violations of competition whereby the Agency only initiates 
proceedings and a decision is issued by the Misdemeanours Court is also mentioned as a 
bad solution.
22  The table is taken from Jasminka PecotiÊ, ‘Praksa Agencije za Zaštitu Tržišnog Natjecan-
ja i Upravnog Suda RH u Pravu Tržišnog Natjecanja’, materials for a specialised course on 
Competition Law and State Aid in the EU, Faculty of Law Rijeka - Tempus Project, Rijeka, 
2005, and is based on data provided by the Agency.
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It is to be expected that the number of competition cases will even-
tually increase and bring about a change in the Administrative Court’s 
approach. 
The Administrative Court dealt with the case referred to above from 
2003 until 2006 and reached a judgment (Us-4832/2003-6) on 9 Novem-
ber 2006 which was published in the Offi cial Gazette (29/07) in March 
2007. In the statement of grounds, the Court set forth the statements of 
the Applicant (PZ Auto Ltd):
In the statement of grounds of the contested judgment, with regard to 
the application of methods, criteria and standards of the comparative law 
of the European Union relating to the distribution of motor vehicles, the 
Applicant sees the misuse of laws and by-laws, contesting that Croatian 
competition law, as applied at the moment, does not contain any by-laws 
which regulate undertakings on the distribution of motor vehicles mar-
ket. The applicant argues that the authority to apply such rules has been 
derived from Article 70 (2) of the SAA and Interim Agreement. However, 
Article 140 of the Croatian Constitution provides that international agree-
ments in force constitute a part of the internal legal order. The SAA is not in 
force and therefore should not have been applied. The interim agreement, 
on the other hand, entered into force on 1 March 2002, while the letter of 
intent was cancelled on 26 March 2001, almost a year before the Interim 
Agreement entered into force and therefore, the body against which the 
application has been brought applied the Interim Agreement retroactively, 
which is not permitted. With regard to Article 35(2) of the Interim Agree-
ment, which provides that any practices contrary to this provision will be 
assessed on the basis of criteria arising from the competition rules appli-
cable in the Community, especially Articles 81, 82, 86 and 87 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and specifi c Community instru-
ments adopted on this basis, the Applicant states that there are no offi cial 
Croatian translations of such texts and nor are the interpretative instru-
ments of international contracts published. The Applicant also points to 
the difference between the terms comparative law of the EU and EU law.
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 total  structure 
total 1 18 6 8 7 7 11 58 100% 
unsolved 0 3 3 6 6 7 8 33 56.90% 
fi nalised 1 15 3 2 1 0 3 25 43.10% 
claim accepted 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 4 16.00% 
claim refused 1 11 2 1 1 0 1 17 68.00% 
claim rejected 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 8.00% 
claim dropped 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 8.00%
Table 1 Filed complaints before the Administrative Court in each report-
ing period 1997-2003
Source: Croatian Competition Agency, Economic Analysis Department
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The Administrative Court disagreed with the Applicant and deter-
mined as follows: 
The body against whom the action was brought has not misused the 
law by applying the methods, criteria and standards of the compara-
tive law of the European Union regarding the distribution of motor 
vehicles. The body affi rms that in the absence of domestic by-laws 
to determine the methods, criteria and standards needed to assess 
the agreement, it applies the methods, criteria and standards of the 
comparative law of the EU relating to the distribution of motor ve-
hicles. In this way, in the interest of the parties concerned, it shows 
a uniform approach in its assessment and highlights the methods 
and standards which it applies as criteria, thereby eliminating the 
possibility of using discretion in assessing the lawfulness of the pro-
ceedings, thus granting equality of all parties before it as a public 
authority. The Applicant23 did not apply the above-mentioned inter-
national acts and criteria solely as a legal rule, but is authorised to 
apply them on the basis of Articles 70 and 130 of the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement between the European Community and 
its Member States and the Republic of Croatia.
The SAA regulates competition in Articles 40, 69 and 70 and it is pro-
vided for that any practices contrary to these provisions will be assessed 
on the basis of the criteria concerning competition rules applicable in the 
Community, especially Articles 81, 82, 86 and 87 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community and specifi c Community instruments adopted 
on this basis. Articles 40 and 70 of the SAA correspond to Articles 27 and 
35 of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related provisions between 
the European Community and the Republic of Croatia. The Interim Agree-
ment was signed on 29 October 2001 and was temporarily applied from 1 
January 2002. It entered into force on 1 March 2002 and will be applied 
until the entering into force of the SAA.24 The fact that the disputed con-
tract which is to be assessed in this matter was signed before the entering 
into force of the Interim Agreement does not mean that aforementioned 
Agreement cannot be applied to it. This is because such international 
agreements have the purpose of eliminating from the market all arrange-
ments that restrict or frustrate free competition.
Given the above, the Administrative Court refused the Applicant’s 
(PZ Auto Ltd) claim as non-grounded. Thus, the undertaking had ex-
hausted its regular legal remedies.
23  This is obviously a composition error. The word ‘Applicant’ should be ‘Defendant’ or 
‘body against whom the case was brought’.
24  Given that this judgment was issued at a panel session on 9 November 2006, the Admin-
istrative Court should have known that the SAA had entered into force on 1 February 2005 
(OG - International Agreements 1/05).
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It is interesting that at approximately the same time, the Admin-
istrative Court in another three-judge panel reached a completely op-
posite decision. This was the judgment of the Administrative Court No 
Us-5438/3002-7 of 26 October 2006, published in Offi cial Gazette No 
16 in February 2007. Without examining the subject matter of the case, 
for the purpose of this paper it is necessary to highlight that part of the 
explanation of the judgment regarding the application of the criteria and 
standards of EU law by the Agency. The statement of grounds discusses 
that part of the claim that refl ects the Applicant’s position on the ques-
tion. This part states: 
The criteria and standards of EU law on the assessment of vertical 
agreements on which the accused body relies without mentioning 
the legal source are Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community and acts of the Commission on the application of 
Article 81, which expressly regulate admissible and non-admissible 
terms of contracts. It should be borne in mind that Article 81 of 
the said agreement and the said acts represent regulations of the 
EU that regulate competition in the internal common market, ie the 
market inside the EU. The Applicant considers that the provision 
of Article 35 of the Interim Agreement, that is Article 70 of the Sta-
bilisation and Association Agreement, can in no way be interpreted 
as an obligation (or authorisation) on the part of the authorities or 
other Croatian state bodies to directly apply the said provisions of 
the agreement and ‘interpretative instruments adopted by the Com-
munity institutions’, but can only be interpreted as the obligation 
of Croatia, as the signatory, to harmonise its legislation regarding 
competition with the legislation of the EU. The Applicant points out 
that the Competition Act does not regulate vertical agreements. By 
showing that the criteria contained in the provisions of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and ‘interpretative instru-
ments adopted by the Community institutions’ would be applicable 
in Croatia without the provisions and ‘instruments’ being published 
in an international agreement or incorporated and published in 
Croatian regulations, the Applicant demonstrates the direct applica-
tion of foreign law in Croatia, which is against the provisions estab-
lished in Article 4 of the Administrative Disputes Act and Article 19 
of the Croatian Constitution.
The Administrative Court replied in an affi rmative manner to the Ap-
plicant’s claims in the second part of the explanation. It stated: 
Regarding the application of the law, it must be stated that Article 
140 of the Constitution states that international agreements that 
are concluded and ratifi ed in accordance with the Constitution and 
made public shall be part of the Republic’s internal legal order and 
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shall in terms of legal effect supersede the law. Therefore, in this 
case the SAA and Interim Agreement could have been applied. How-
ever, the criteria, standards and interpretative instruments of the 
European Community upon which the body against whom the ac-
tion was brought relies, are not included in the text of the agreement 
or incorporated or published in any other Croatian law or regulation, 
and therefore cannot be a source of law.
As a result of this situation the Court had sent out a confusing mes-
sage. Comparatively, the situation appeared as follows:
Judgment of the 
Administrative Court
No Us-5438/2003-7 of 
26 October 2006 
(OG 16/07)
Judgment of the Administrative Court
No Us-4832/2003-6 of 9 November 2006 
(OG 29/07)
The SAA and Interim 
Agreement could have 
been applied. However, 
the criteria, standards 
and interpretative in-
struments of the Euro-
pean Community upon 
which the body against 
whom the action had 
been brought relies, 
which are not included 
in the text of the agree-
ment or incorporated or 
published in any other 
Croatian law or regula-
tion, cannot be a source 
of law.
The body against whom the action had been 
brought had not misused the law by apply-
ing the methods, criteria and standards of the 
comparative law of the EU.
In the absence of domestic by-laws to deter-
mine the methods, criteria and standards 
needed to assess the agreement, the methods, 
criteria and standards of the comparative law 
of the EU are applied.
Consequently, in the interest of the parties, a 
uniform approach in assessment is adopted 
and the methods and standards applied as 
criteria are clearly highlighted, thereby elimi-
nating any possibility of using discretion in the 
assessment of the lawfulness of the proceed-
ings, thus ensuring the equality of all parties 
before that body as a public authority.
The above-mentioned international acts and 
criteria are not applied as sole legal rules, as 
their application is authorised on the basis of 
Articles 70 and 130 of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement.
Such a situation was somewhat expected for those who were familiar 
with the Croatian judiciary.25 Nevertheless, it is almost incomprehensible 
25  At a public discussion organised by the Jurist Club of the City of Zagreb under the title 
‘The Stabilisation and Accession Agreement with the EU and Croatian Legislation’, held 
on 14 November 2002, Professor Siniša Rodin predicted situations like this by saying: ‘1 If 
the Agreement is directly applicable in the Croatian legal system, and it is, then our judges 
already need to understand Articles 81, 82, 86 and 87 and the complete court practice and 
257CYELP 4 [2008] 247-265
how a panel that stated the criteria, standards and interpretative instru-
ments of the European Community could not be a source of law did not 
take into account the clear and unambiguous provision of Article 35 (3) 
of the CCA which provides: 
In the assessment of the forms of prevention, restriction or distor-
tion of competition which could affect trade between the Republic 
of Croatia and the European Community, the Agency in accordance 
with Article 70 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement will 
apply in an appropriate way … criteria which derive from the 
proper use of competition rules in the European Community. 
(emphasis added)
It is typical that PZ Auto Ltd, in its constitutional complaint that fol-
lowed the judgment of the Administrative Court, relies on the dissenting 
position of the Administrative Court according to which criteria, stand-
ards and interpretative instruments of the European Community that are 
not included in the SAA or included or published in any other Croatian 
law or regulation cannot be a source of law. 
The Constitutional Court, on the basis of Article 125 of the Constitu-
tion, decides on constitutional complaints against individual acts of state 
bodies, bodies of local or regional self-government, or legal persons with 
public authority, when they have violated human rights or fundamental 
freedoms or the right to local and regional self-government as guaranteed 
by the Constitution. This is further elaborated upon in Article 62 of the 
Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court,26 which states that if an-
other other legal remedy is provided against a violation of constitutional 
acquis which have been developed on the basis of these articles. Whether that is really the 
case, you can judge for yourself; 2 If we have the obligation to adjust future legislation then 
a fortiori we must interpret our existing legislation in favour of the SAA and the whole ac-
quis; 3 Our courts, especially regular courts, have undertaken the responsibility of applying 
the acquis in so far as we have accepted it, and in so far as we have to interpret our legisla-
tion. There is a certain jeopardy, and that is the possible disorientation of our judiciary, 
which is completely unprepared for such a venture.’ In his paper ‘Pridruživanje Hrvatske 
Europskoj Uniji: Preobrazba Pravnog Sustava’ in Pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj Uniji 
- sv 1 - Ekonomski i Pravni Izazovi, (Institute for Public Finances & Foundation Friedrich 
Ebert, Zagreb 2002) he gives another possibility: ‘Under the interpretative principle favour-
ing conventions, ie the interpretation of national legislation in accordance with international 
agreements, national courts of associated states can interpret the provisions of national law 
in accordance with the provisions of accession agreements, taking into consideration the 
present acquis communautaire, including the practice of the European Court. Such practice 
could eventually lead to the acceptance of the direct effect of directly applicable provisions 
of primary, and perhaps also secondary legislation, which derive from the accession agree-
ment. The argument in favour of this approach is that associated states, by undertaking 
obligations from the agreement, intend to adjust national legal orders to the legal order of 
European law. The consequence of such intentions is also the obligation to interpret na-
tional law and accession agreements in accordance with the acquis communautaire.’
26  OG 49/02.
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rights, a constitutional complaint may be lodged only after this remedy 
has been exhausted. In matters in which an administrative dispute is 
provided for, as far as revision of civil or extra-litigation proceedings are 
concerned, a remedy is considered to be exhausted after a decision has 
been taken on that remedy. Article 68 additionally states that a panel 
composed of six judges will decide upon constitutional complaints, and 
that a panel comprising three judges will decide on constitutional com-
plaints when procedural requirements for deciding upon them do not 
exist (eg lateness, no authorisation to lodge a constitutional complaint, 
inadmissibility etc). The panel can only decide unanimously and when all 
its members are present. If the panel does not reach a unanimous deci-
sion, or if the panel holds that the matter of the constitutional complaint 
is of broader signifi cance, a Session of the Constitutional Court shall 
decide on the complaint.
In the case of the complaint of PZ Auto Ltd, a Session of the Consti-
tutional Court decided. Since there were no dissenting opinions, it can be 
concluded that such a means of deciding was chosen because the case 
was of ‘broader signifi cance’.
At the session held on 13 February 2008, the Constitutional Court 
unanimously27 reached a decision in which it rejected the constitutional 
complaint of PZ Auto Ltd against Administrative Court judgment No Us-
4832/2003-6 of 9 September 2006 (OG 29/07), which referred to the 
Agency’s decision Class: UP/I-030-02/2002-01/32, No 580-02-03-10-75 
of 18 February 2003, as non-grounded. In the constitutional complaint, 
the Applicant alleged that the disputed Agency decision and Administra-
tive Court judgment violated its constitutional rights as granted by Arti-
cle 14(2) and Article 49(1) of the Constitution.28 Besides a claim based on 
wrongful and incomplete determination of the facts, the Applicant based 
its complaint on the misuse of law.29 The Applicant also stated that its 
practice had been wrongfully determined as a violation of Article 13 of 
the CCA as in force at the time. It stated that the mentioned provision 
27  The Constitutional Court comprised Željko PotoËnjak as presiding  judge, and Marko 
BabiÊ, Mario Kos, Davor Krapac, Ivan Matija, Jasna Omejec, Agata RaËan, Aldo RadoloviÊ 
and Nevenka »ernhorst as members of the panel.
28  Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (OG 41/01 - consolidated version and 55/01 
- correction); Art 14 (2) states: ‘All shall be equal before the law’, Art 49 (1) states: ‘Entrepre-
neurial and market freedom shall be the basis of the economic system of the Republic’.
29  It is the position of the Applicant that in proceedings before the Agency the SAA could 
not have been applied since it entered into force on 1 February 2005, and nor could the 
Interim Agreement apply since it entered into force on 1 March 2002. The Applicant points 
to the fact that both agreements entered into force after 26 February 2002 when it cancelled 
business co-operation with AMC Meimurje Ltd, and given that these agreements cannot be 
applied retroactively, such application by the Agency was against Art 90 (1) of the Constitu-
tion, which states: ‘Before coming into force, laws shall be published in “Narodne Novin”, 
the Republic’s offi cial gazette.’
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distinguished between monopolistic and dominant positions, while in the 
disputed judgment these two terms were mixed and thus, it was not clear 
which violation of the law had been committed. The Applicant also dis-
puted the Court’s fi nding that the relevant market refers to the Croatian 
market for Volkswagen vehicles, stating that the relevant market should 
be considered to be the market for all vehicles.30
4. Interpretation
Before analysing the Constitutional Court’s decision, certain factors 
should be emphasised. The purpose of the SAA is to gradually make ex-
isting laws and future legislation compatible with the acquis communau-
taire, as provided for in Article 69 which stipulates: 
1.  The Parties recognize the importance of the approximation of 
Croatia’s existing legislation to that of the Community. Croatia shall 
endeavour to ensure that its existing laws and future legislation will 
be gradually made compatible with the Community acquis. 
2.  This approximation will start on the date of signing of the Agree-
ment, and will gradually extend to all the elements of the Commu-
nity acquis referred to in this Agreement by the end of the period 
defi ned in article 5 of this Agreement. In particular, at an early stage, 
it will focus on fundamental elements of the Internal Market acquis 
as well as on other trade-related areas, on the basis of a programme 
to be agreed between the Commission of the European Communities 
and Croatia. Croatia will also defi ne, in agreement with the Commis-
sion of the European Communities, the modalities for the monitor-
ing of the implementation of approximation of legislation and law 
enforcement actions to be taken. (emphasis added)
It should be emphasised that the obligation of harmonising the law 
started with the date of the signing of the SAA and not on the day of its 
entering into force. This provision should also be placed within the con-
text of the political goal of Croatia to become a full member of the EU. To 
this end, the Resolution of the Croatian Parliament of 18 December 2002 
(OG 153/02) states that: ‘the Republic of Croatia’s full membership of the 
EU is a strategic national goal which the Croatian Parliament in its future 
activities will fully and constantly support.’ The National Programme of 
the Republic of Croatia for Accession to the EU (OG 30/03) defi nes mem-
bership of the EU as being in the ‘national interest’. Given that in the 
period between the signing of the SAA and its ratifi cation Croatia gained 
the status of candidate country for full membership of the EU, it is obvi-
30  The Applicant states that its share in the market of all vehicles in Croatia in 2001 was 
11.32%, and in 2002 9.89%, which shows that it had neither a monopoly nor a dominant 
position on the market at the time in question.
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ous that all sources of law, including the SAA, with the legal effect of an 
international agreement must be interpreted in the spirit of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community31 and the court precedents of the 
European Court of Justice seated in Luxembourg (hereinafter: ECJ).
The Constitutional Court, which is the highest court with powers to 
correct court practice in Croatia (although under the system of separa-
tion of powers it is not formally part of the judiciary, but a separate sui 
generis fourth power) has shown that it understands the core of Europe-
an law. In decision U-III.1410/2007, the Constitutional Court, after giv-
ing a summary of fi rst instance proceedings before the Agency and court 
proceedings before the Administrative Court, emphasised that Article 70 
(1) of the SAA and Article 36(1) of the Interim Agreement stipulate, among 
other things, that in so far as it may affect trade between the Community 
and Croatia, abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
in the territories of the Community or of Croatia as a whole or in a sub-
stantial part thereof is considered incompatible with the proper applica-
tion of the SAA and Interim Agreement. The Constitutional Court here 
emphasised that conduct against the provisions of the SAA and Interim 
Agreement must be interpreted on the basis of the criteria derived from 
the application of the competition rules of the European Community, es-
pecially Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity and the interpretative instruments adopted by the institutions of 
the European Community (Article 70 (2) of the SAA and Article 35 (2) of 
the Interim Agreement). In a long-awaited judgment,32 the Constitutional 
Court stated the following: 
Following the previously said, in cases where distortion of competi-
tion is being assessed, Croatian bodies that deal with competition 
are authorised and obliged to apply criteria that derive from the 
31  Art 10 (previously Art 5) of the Treaty establishing the European Community contains 
the obligation of loyalty and the principle of fi delity, the aims of which are positive co-op-
eration in fulfi lling obligations arising out of the Treaty and support for the Community. 
It prohibits any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the 
Treaty. See Simonetta Gerli, Compendio di Diritto dell’unione Europea (Diritto Comunitario); 
Aspetti Giuridici e Istituzionali (Esselibri, Napoli 2003). A similar provision should have been 
contained in the European Constitution. See Olivier Duhamel, Le Constitution Européenne 
(Armand Colin, Paris 2005). In this respect, the judgment was very important in the case 
Factortame I (Case-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame [1990] 
ECR I-2433 [1990] 3 WLR 852) where it was determined that from the perspective of the 
Community, loyalty to the Treaties obliges Member States to loyally fulfi l their treaty ob-
ligations, to which should be added the coherent and unlimited fulfi lment of community 
law, especially when creating their national legal orders. See Stephen Weatherill, Cases & 
Materials on EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford - New York 2003).
32  This was a long-awaited judgment that many experts had predicted. In this respect I 
would like to single out Academician Jakša BarbiÊ and Professors Siniša Rodin and Tamara 
»apeta from the Department for Public European Law of the Faculty of Law at the Univer-
sity of Zagreb.
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application of the competition rules of the European Community 
and interpretative instruments adopted by the institutions of the 
European Community. In this respect the SAA and Interim Agree-
ment oblige Croatian bodies in charge of protection of competition, 
that when resolving cases, not only to apply Croatian competition 
law, but also take into consideration the rules of competition law of 
the European Community. (emphasis added)
The Constitutional Court considered that the provisions of the SAA 
and Interim Agreement could have been applied in the proceedings before 
the Agency and Administrative Court in a general manner, provided that 
the conduct of the undertaking was being assessed at a time when these 
international agreements were in force. The Constitutional Court raised 
the question of application of the criteria, standards and interpretative in-
struments of the European Community, which means the SAA and Interim 
Agreement. With regard to the Applicant’s claim that the criteria, stand-
ards and interpretative instruments of the European Community could 
not be applied due to the fact that they had not been included or published 
in any Croatian law or regulation and thus were not a source of law, the 
Constitutional Court responded that such a statement had no grounds as 
the aforementioned criteria, standards and instruments were not applied 
as a primary source of law but only as a subsidiary means of interpreta-
tion. The Constitutional Court took the stand that Article 70(2) of the SAA 
and Article 35(2) of the Interim Agreement had to be interpreted in the con-
text of Croatia’s obligation to harmonise its legislation, including that part 
that regulates competition, with the European acquis. When applying such 
harmonised legislation, the state bodies of Croatia are obliged to apply it 
as it would be applied in the EU, ie with regard to the purpose and spirit of 
the provisions with which the legislation is harmonised. This derives from 
the provision of Article 70(2) of the SAA which states:  
Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis 
of criteria arising from the application of the competition rules ap-
plicable in the Community, in particular from Articles 81, 82, 86 and 
87 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and inter-
pretative instruments adopted by the Community institutions.
In this respect, when assessing whether practices of a certain un-
dertaking are in accordance with competition rules, not only are Croatian 
competition rules relevant, but due regard must also be given to all Euro-
pean Community competition rules. The Constitutional Court concluded: 
The law of the European Community is not formally introduced into 
the Croatian legal order by virtue of the provisions of the SAA as an 
international agreement, but it is provided for that Croatian compe-
tition rules should be applied in the light of the rules, criteria and 
principles of competition law.
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In the Constitutional Court’s opinion, what had occurred in the ad-
ministrative proceedings before the Agency and the application of the 
criteria, standards and interpretative instruments of the European Com-
munity was the fi lling of a legal gap in a way that conformed to the spirit 
of national law and that was not contrary to the explicit solutions of the 
CCA in force at the time.
At the end of its judgment, the Constitutional Court concluded:
- that competition rules are by their nature public law due to their 
purpose of protecting the public good (free competition), and due 
to the fact that they serve the exercising of entrepreneurial and 
market freedoms in a way that prevents, among other things, un-
dertakings from violating the entrepreneurial and market freedoms 
of other undertakings and consumers, and
- that by the mere restriction of the conduct of an undertaking that 
distorts competition, the protection of free competition can be pro-
vided for.
5. What now?
With its decision of 18 February 2008, the Constitutional Court has 
shown Croatian courts what course they should take in this pre-accession 
period. We must be aware that a long time still has to pass until teleologi-
cal interpretation of legal rules suppresses the widely accepted linguistic 
interpretation. However, the Constitutional Court has, by virtue of its au-
thority, taken a huge step in this direction. It was to be expected that the 
fi rst interpretative doubts would occur precisely in the fi elds that have en-
tered for the fi rst time into our legal system through the process of acces-
sion to the EU. The matter of competition is the best example of this. This 
case showed all the weaknesses of the existing system in its provision of 
remedies against the Agency’s decision in the form of initiating an admin-
istrative dispute before the Administrative Court. In the future, the regular 
courts will face further disputes that require the interpretation of national 
law in accordance with the purpose and spirit of European law.
For now, a situation in which two panels of the same court decide on 
subject matter of the highest importance in a completely opposite man-
ner may testify to the degree of independence of judges, but more prob-
ably speaks of a certain lack of knowledge.33 
33  Professor Zvonimir Lauc in his paper ‘Osposobljenost Sudaca za Pošteno Suenje i Razu-
man Rok’ in Arsen BaËiÊ and others, Pravo na Pošteno Suenje i Razuman Rok - Pravo Azila 
(Organizator, Zagreb 2003) claims that the independence of judges is manifested through 
the issuance of judgments, which means through the interpretation of regulations. This in 
turn means that judges must be great interpreters of regulations, but also connoisseurs 
of the circumstances to which regulations refer. In a concrete case, the court panel in Us-
5438/2003-7 of 26 October 2006 (OG 16/2007) failed in this respect.
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There are a few brave judges in Croatia who have no fear about stating 
their opinions and are prepared to argue for them. Our judicial system has 
become so bureaucratic that, unlike American (and now European) stu-
dents who quote judgments of well-known judges (and opinions of attorney 
generals), our students are perhaps familiar only with those judges who 
judge war crimes or organised crime cases, or with those whose judgments 
the public makes fun of or condemns. To make things worse, court spokes-
men have recently been introduced as the interface between the public and 
judges, which has the purpose of reducing public interest in trials. How-
ever, no matter how much one tries to reduce the interest of legal experts 
in court practice, such experts have a right and obligation to analyse court 
practice, comment on it and point to the discrepancies and misuse of law 
that they notice. As long as there is a judge capable of saying: 
… the criteria, standards and interpretative instruments of the Eu-
ropean Community upon which the body against whom the action 
was brought relies, are not included in the text of the agreement or 
incorporated or published in any other Croatian law or regulation, 
and therefore cannot be a source of law
Croatia has a serious problem34 and we should not close our eyes to 
it. It is inappropriate35 to comment here whether Croatia should become 
a member state of the EU or not, but euroscepticism cannot become an 
alibi for ignorance and misinterpretation of the law. The question of the 
effectiveness of the judiciary is one of the fundamental problems of all 
countries in transition.36 Transition does not only mean changes in the 
34  At a public discussion organised by the Jurist Club of the City of Zagreb under the title 
‘The Stabilisation and Accession Agreement with the EU and Croatian Legislation’ held on 
14 November 2002, Academician Jakša BarbiÊ unambiguously concluded: ‘We already have 
some regulations that are very close to European standards. It only takes a little to adjust 
them to newer things, but unfortunately they are applied in a Balkan manner from the ju-
diciary downwards. This is a Croatian problem. And when we speak of the legal side of the 
problem, I think this will be the hardest. What does this mean? In all segments of society, 
an effort should be made to lift the level of expert deliberation and conduct, and not only 
in the matter of legislation. I will now state a heretical idea that I have, and that I wrote in 
one of our high profi le academic journals. There is no real political will for this in Croatia. 
There is at the declarative level, but not at the real one, because if there was real political 
will, steps would have been taken, ones to which experts have been alert for a long time, 
moves that are really not hard to take and which in comparison to the benefi ts they bring, 
the costs are a bargain. However, this has not happened. I am not talking about left-wing or 
right-wing parties. I am talking about the entire Croatian political arena.’    
35  The geopolitical position of Croatia and the moment of its international recognition 
played a crucial role in its deciding in favour of the EU, and full membership will also occur 
in the context of global events. Still, it would be better if the Croatian political elite was not 
so obsessed with the date of gaining full membership, but rather focused on the education 
of all those who will have a decisive role in a future European Croatia. This of course refers 
to the judiciary as well.
36  See Michal Bobek,  ‘A New Legal Order, or a Non-Existent One? Some (Early) Experi-
ences in the Application of EU Law in Central Europe’ (2006) 2 Croatian Yearbook of Euro-
264 Boris StaniÊ: The Interpretative Effect of European Law in the Judgment...
economic system, but also very painful political, social and especially 
legal reforms. Given the subject matter of this paper, we should restrict 
ourselves to legal reforms. These refer to:
a) legislative reform,
b) judicial reform (and administrative, as well37), and
c) the training of all who participate in these systems.38
Some legal experts mention the need to achieve a certain degree of 
legal culture in all Central European countries in transition.39 However, 
it should also be noted that there are other opinions which point to the 
fact that the world today is different from fi fty, or even fi fteen years ago, 
and that the defi nitions that have formed the basis of the opinions of 
(continental) jurists for centuries are questionable. The notions of state 
and sovereignty, private and international law, human rights, civil so-
ciety, court precedence, and criminal responsibility40 are today ready to 
be redefi ned, and judges are the fi rst that will have to take their share 
of responsibility. Hopefully, the availability of court judgments in the Of-
fi cial Gazette and on the internet will bring about greater responsibility 
and raise the profi le of new generations of judges that will make inter-
pretations by which they will be remembered, because law today is not 
engraved in stone. Naturally, Croatian judges are not the fi rst to face this 
responsibility. For example, a few years ago in Poland, at a time when it 
was a candidate for full membership of the EU, a question arose concern-
ing the application of the aquis communautaire. The Polish Constitutional 
Court resolved doubts with an interesting standpoint: 
Of course, EU law is not legally binding in Poland. However, the 
Constitutional Court would like to emphasise the provisions of Ar-
ticles 68 and 69 [Poland Accession Agreement] ... With this, Poland 
is obliged to put ‘its best efforts into ensuring that future legislation 
pean Law & Policy 265 and Daniela NováËková, Základy Európskeho Práva a Vnútorný Trh 
Európskej Únie (Eurounion, Bratislava 2004).
37  This especially refers to the redefi ning of the role and radical reform of the Administra-
tive Court.
38  This refers to members of Parliament, the executive power, judiciary and public admin-
istration.
39  See Siniša Rodin, ‘Discourse and Authority in European and Post-Communist Legal Cul-
ture’ (2005) 1 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy 1; Zdenék Kühn, ‘The Authori-
tarian Legal Culture at Work: the Passivity of Parties and the Interpretational Statements of 
Supreme Courts’ (2006) 2 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy 19; Tamara »apeta, 
‘Interpretativni UËinak Europskog Prava u Ëlanstvu i prije Ëlanstva u EU’ [2006] 5 Zbornik 
Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu. 
40  For example, a student that twenty years ago in an exam on criminal law stated that a 
legal entity could be held criminally liable, would for sure not have passed the exam. Today, 
the concept of the criminal liability of a legal entity is accepted and thus, Croatia has in-
cluded it in its legal system. See The Criminal Liability of Legal Entities Act (OG 151/03).
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is in accordance with that of the Community’ ... The Constitutional 
Court considers that the obligation to ensure the compatibility of 
legislation (which is primarily the obligation of Parliament and the 
Government) also results in the obligation to interpret existing leg-
islation in such a way as to ensure the highest possible degree of 
compatibility.41
The fact that Croatia has fi nally met one such decision does not 
give us the right to think that our work is done. It is still our obligation 
to closely monitor how the law is interpreted, and to point to those judg-
ments that do not have all the qualities that court judgments need to 
have in this pre-accession period.
41  Taken from Tamara »apeta, ‘Interpretativni UËinak Europskog Prava u Ëlanstvu i prije 
Ëlanstva u EU’ [2006] 5 Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu in which the author refers to 
the original presented by Professor Z Kühn in his paper ‘Application of European Law in 
Central European Candidate Countries’ (2003) 28 ELRev 551.
